Ignalina – a Chernobyl on the Baltic?

The two reactors at the Ignalina nuclear power station are the second biggest in the world – and among the most dangerous. Commissioned in 1983 and 1987 they are both RBMKs, the same type of reactor that exploded at Chernobyl. They provide approximately 80% of Lithuania’s electricity. Lithuania assumed ownership of the reactors in August 1991 following the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Safety problems in RBMKs

RBMKs are considered to be one of the most dangerous models ever built. A report for the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) stated that "many nuclear experts think that these reactors cannot be improved to standards acceptable for long-term operation".

Two specific problems, which contributed to the Chernobyl disaster, are present in the Ignalina reactors:

· no containment vessel to contain or reduce the release of radioactivity in the event of a leak;
· the core contains large amounts of graphite, which is a highly flammable agent. This intensifies the risk of an accident developing into a catastrophe. Each of the Ignalina reactors has a core consisting of 1600 tonnes of graphite.

In addition to these generic problems, Ignalina has a host of specific faults. A 1996 report by the United States Department of Energy concluded:
"Mounting problems and pressures at the Ignalina nuclear power plant are increasing the risk of an accident. Conditions that are deemed so important in the West for preventing accidents (like conservative "forgiving" plant design; adequate funds; and strong regulatory oversight) are simply absent at Ignalina."

Prospects for closure

In 1992 the G7 summit in Munich agreed to work towards the early closure of those Soviet units which could not be upgraded to an ‘acceptable’ level. Included in this were the Ignalina units. A special fund was set up, the Nuclear Safety Account (NSA), to help fund early closure, and was given to the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) to administer.

In 1994 the EBRD gave Lithuania a 33 million ECU grant from the NSA for short term safety improvements at Ignalina. In exchange Lithuania had to agree not to "rechannel" either reactor, a process that essentially involves replacing the 1600 odd pressure tubes in the reactor core. This process would extend the life of the reactors by about 15-20 years. When the agreement was signed, the EBRD believed that rechannelling would become necessary by about 1998 and 2004 for both units, and that they would then close (1). The European Commission now wants unit 1 to be shut by 2002, with unit 2 closing 5 years later.

Recently however, the Lithuania Government has said that it will operate the reactors for much longer than this, at least up to 2010. The Lithuanian Government has even raised the prospect of rechanneling the reactors, which would allow them to operate until 2025. Both of these options represent a grave threat to the people and environment of Europe.

The Ignalina reactors are unnecessary

Even if the Ignalina reactors were closed immediately Lithuania would still be able to meet its electricity needs. As with all Central and Eastern European countries, Lithuania has massive overcapacity and great scope for energy efficiency and conservation. The total installed capacity in Lithuania is 6, 324MW, while peak demand is only 2,086MW. The Ignalina nuclear power plant provides 2,500MW. An August 1998 World Bank study of Lithuania concluded:

"If only half of the estimated potential annual energy saving from conservation were realized, the country would have no need for its nuclear power plant" (2) .

EU enlargement

In December the European Council will meet in Helsinki. It will discuss whether to open negotiations with Ignalina. All EU member states must clearly state that they will not start negotitions unless Lithuania agrees to immediate closure of Ignalina.

Greenpeace demands

The Ignalina reactors represent an acute threat to the whole of Europe. They must be closed immediately. Unit 1 should be closed this year, and unit 2 in 2000. The only thing standing in the way of the closure of Ignalina is a lack of political will.


1. Nuclear Energy Institute, Source Book: Soviet-designed NPPs in Russia, Ukraine, Lithuania, the Czech Republic, the Slovak Republic, Hungary and Bulgaria, 1995.

2. "Lithuania; an opportunity for economic success", World Bank, August 1998.

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